ok, let’s speed run this because I’m getting bored:
Bolsonaro wins and immediately the feeble alliance behind him starts dissolving. he manages to get social security reform through Congress, but just barely and obviously weaker than it would need to be to give him the fiscal breathing space to actually consolidate power.
he doesn’t even need to worry about that, though, because pandemic hits, and whatever surplus he had went down the drain. (in another post, i need to muse about how basically no right-wing government managed to do a simple power grab given a sanitary crisis. some serious incompetence here)
Bolsonaro’s “strategy” for the pandemic – if you can call it so – was refusing to acknowledge it. initially he denied anything was happening, then ignored the piling corpses to deny the severity of the problem, then expected everything to go away quickly with “herd immunity”, then played the victim. the crazier the situation got, the more the technical names in his cabinet went away, and thus he lost most of the support he had in the educated middle classes. this would later cost him the 2022 election.
the ultimatum for a large part of this constitution would be Sergio Moro quitting his role as Minister of Justice amidst clear intimidation by Bolsonaro to avoid his sons getting investigated. this, coupled with the clear disregard for any scientific or specialist voices could never sit well with a class of people that believes their greatest distinction is exactly how much science they’ve learnt.
here as well is where Bolsonaro’s troubles with the judiciary branch in general, and STF in particular come into focus. to sustain his fiction scenario, Bolsonaro needed to spread – broad and wide – tons of made up information, first about the pandemic, then about the safety of elections in Brazil. the judiciary, in a rather cleaver karate movement, used that as a great excuse to upgrade their powers, which now includes investigation and indicting.
with this side of the alliance clearly beyond repair, he focused on getting as much of the landed oligarchies on his side as possible. massive amounts of federal government resources were piped into small countryside towns, in order to be used by congressmen as a way to get themselves elected again (it also couldn’t hurt to pocket some of it). this was actually the fundamental design of 1988’s magna carta, so nobody really got scandalised this time.
but this also meant the talk about “efficient government” was all but over. as the fiscal situation went back again into painful territory – coupled with high interest rates, high inflation and high energy prices – corporate interests removed themselves from supporting the (now mostly bankrupt) government. the only financial strategy was cashing in on the world-high interest.
***
okay, now we’re into “current history” field, and i don’t think i have enough information to make a lot of predictions. but let’s try a few moves:
first up, it’s clear that the judiciary branch has gotten more power, as would have been expected already in 2018, if not before. but this newly found power is yet to be formalised. it’s definitely not out of scope to imagine that in the next election cycle, the pendulum could return with a whip and take that power away – together with the people now holding it. this is probably the most contentious issue right now, and although i think some formal agreement of forces will eventually carve the current situation in stone, I’d say it’s 50/50.
second, it’s not clear either how much longer the very model will sustain itself. the identification of landed oligarchies with Congress seems to be stable, but just one election cycle could fill the chambers with people more allied with corporate interests or educated middle classes. the current composition is already veering in that direction. it’s also not clear how much longer the presidency will be a proxy for corporate interests – since major broadcasting clearly lost a lot of its purchase.
either way, very interesting times are ahead.
Antinomia Imediata 