David Friedman proposes, in his classic Machinery of Freedom, a world of protection agencies, in contract with each other, so as to replace nation-states. the only difference from this to Moldbug’s Patchwork is territoriality. Moldbug dismisses right away the military feasibility of protection agencies competing over the same territory (as the good Hobbesian he is), and so territorializes Friedman’s agencies in Webberian-state-like corporations.
are non-territorial sovcorps, and so ancap itself, feasible? let’s start with Moldbug’s model and make only a few feasible transformations, and see if the end result looks like something an ancap would love more than the Patchwork.
the first transformation is for a territorial sovcorp to allow private courts in its territory. although it’s still solely responsible for any enforcement in its territory, there’s no reason all judicial procedures need to be carried out by the sovereign. someone may appeal to the sovereign, but it is not required to do anything. also, private courts allows for one less expense and one more source of profits.
the operation of private courts will likely involve insurance agencies, which may start selling insurance policies that include specific adjudication in case of certain crimes or other covered risks.
the next step is a little more rogue, but equally feasible. the sovcorp abstains itself from enforcing contracts or law (now private) inside its territory, allowing protection agencies to freely enter the market. it’s a bold move, but if has enough military power to remain sovereign in a largely hostile world, it can certainly contain a few private armies. it may demand some sort of regulation, restricting the protection agencies’ military power to the degree it can contain. ultimate appeals are still possible, and conflicts among protection agencies are still mediated by the sovcorp.
another way to think about this is to imagine a virtual federalism, in which protection agencies are states, and the sovcorp is the federal government. essentially, the sovcorp has the same functions as the Constitution originally envisioned for the fedgov: external relations, protection from outside forces, adjudication of conflicts among member states.
the final step is way less bold than the second one, but more consequential. now, the protection agencies become all shareholders of the sovcorp. which turns the sovcorp into a constitutional contract among protection agencies. by either Friedman’s or Long‘s account, this is ancap proper: non-territorial protection agencies in contract among each other, replacing nation-states.
the punch-line of all this reasoning is: ancaps have good reason to spouse neocameralism, since it’s only three feasible steps away from ancapism. how to get to neocameralism? all power to the pilots.